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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Citizens Bank of
Md. v. Strumpf·
A CREDITOR
BANK MAY
TEMPORARILY
FREEZE A
BANKRUPT
DEBTOR'S
CHECKING
ACCOUNT
WITHOUT
VIOLATING AN
AUTOMATIC STAY.

In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme
Court in Citizens Bank ofMd. v.
Strumpf, 116 S. Ct. 286 (1995),
held that a creditor in a bankruptcy action may, to protect its
setoff rights, temporarily withhold payment of a debt that it
owes to a debtor in bankruptcy
without violating an automatic
stay. The Court stressed that
the requirement of an intent to
permanently settle an account
is implicit in Maryland's rule
regarding setoff rights. In so
ruling, the Court acknowledged
that creditor banks may temporarily place an administrative
freeze on a bankrupt debtor's
checking account while seeking relief from the automatic
stay.
When David Strumpf
("Strumpf') filed for relief underChapter 13 oftheBankruptcy Code on January 25, 1991,
he maintained a checking
account with the Citizens Bank
of Maryland ("Citizens").
Strumpf was also in default on
the remaining balance of a
$5,068.75 loan from Citizens.
On October 2, 1991, Citizens
placed an "administrative hold"
on Strumpf s checking account,
claiming a right to setoff. As a
result, Citizens refused to pay
withdrawals from the account
that would have reduced the
account balance below the
amount due on Strumpf sloan.
Five days later, Citizens filed a
"Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay and for Setoff' in
the Bankruptcy Court under title 11, section 362(d) of the
United States Code. In re-

sponse, Strumpf filed a motion
to hold Citizens in contempt,
claiming that Citizens' administrative hold violated the section 362(a) automatic stay.
The Bankruptcy Court
held that Citizens' administrative hold constituted a setoff in
violation of section 362(a)(7)
and granted Citizens' motion
for relief from the stay, authorizing the bank to set off
Strumpf s remaining checking
account balance against the
unpaid loan. On appeal, the
United States District Court for
the District of Maryland reversed, finding that an administrative hold was not a violation
of section 362(a). The United
States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that an administrative
hold was equivalent to the exercise of a right of setoff, violating the automatic stay of section 362(a)(7).
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to address the issue of whether
a creditor bank in a bankruptcy
action may, to protect its setoff
rights, temporarily withhold
payment ofa debt that it owes to
a debtor in bankruptcy without
violating an automatic stay. Citizens argued that the refusal to
pay its debt to Strumpfwas not
an exercise of the setoff right in
violation of the automatic stay.
Conversel y, the defense argued
that the bank's administrative
hold exercised dominion over
property belonging to Strumpf
and thus violated sections
362(a)(3), 362(a)(6), and
362(a)(7).
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In an opinion written by
Justice Scalia, the Supreme
Court began its analysis by commenting that "the right of setoff
allows entities that owe each
other money to apply mutual
debts against each other, thus
avoiding the absurdity of making A pay B when B owes A."
Citizens at 289 (quoting Studley
v. Boylston Nat. Bank, 229 U.S.
523, 528 (1913». The Court
explained that although the
Bankruptcy Code does not create the right of setoff, section
553(a) provides that, with certain exceptions, bankruptcy preserves any existing setoffrights.
Id. In addition, the Court noted
that Maryland law allows Citizens to set off the defaulted
loan against the checking account balance. Id. The Court
maintained, moreover, that
Strumpf's bankruptcy filing
stayed Citizens' exercise oftheir
setoffright according to section
362(a). Id.
The court agreed with
Citizens that the administrative
hold was not a setoff within the
meaning of section 362(a)(7),
and stressed that Citizens' refusal to pay its debt was temporary while it sought relief under
section 362(d) from the automatic stay. Id. According to
the Court, the issue of whether
the temporary refusal was
wrongful was "a separate matter." Id. The Court found that
a requirement of an intent to
permanently settle accounts is
implicit in most state laws regarding setoffrights. Id. Maryland follows the majority rule
that a setoff occurs when one (i)
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makes a decision to effectuate a
setoff, (ii) takes some action
accomplishing the setoff, and
(iii) enters a recording of the
setoff. Id.
If state law differed, the
Court stated that federal law
determines whether a section
362(a)(7) setoff has occurred.
Id. Consequently, the Court
recognized that "other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
.. would lead us to embrace the
same requirement of an intent
permanently to settle accounts."
Id. Because Citizens' freeze of
Strumpf's checking account
was not intended to permanent.,.
ly reduce Strumpf's account
balance by the amount of the
defaulted loan, the Court concluded that the administrative
hold was not a setoff. Id.
Next, the Court examined the inconsistency between
section 362(a)(7)'s right of setoff and section 542(b)'s provision concerning the turnover of
property to the estate. Id. According to Section 542(b), a
bankrupt's debtor must "pay"
to the trustee "any debt that is
property of the estate ... except
to the extent that such debt may
be offset under section 553 ...
against a claim against the debtor." Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §
542(b). Section553(a),inturn,
provides that the Bankruptcy
Code will not affect a creditor's
pre bankruptcy setoff rights
against the debtor "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 and
363." !d. On that account, the
Court found it an "odd construction" of section 362(a)(7)

to require a creditor with setoff
rights to pay a claim to which a
setoff applies when section
542(b) unequivocally exempts
such action. Id.
The court recognized
that section 553 restricts the
execution of an actual setoff
during an automatic stay and
held that section 553 "undoubtedly refers to section 362(a)(7)."
Id. Furthermore, the Court stated that the section 553(a) "except" clause does not indicate
that section 362(a)(7) requires
the immediate payment ofa debt
subject to setoff. Id. For this
reason, the Court mentioned that
such an interpretation would
render section 553(a)'s right of
setoff meaningless because
"forcing the creditor to pay its
debt immediately . . . would
divest the creditor of the very
thing that supports the right of
setoff." Id.
With
respect
to
Strumpf' s argument that the administrative hold violated sections 362(a)(3) and 362(a)(6),
the Court emphasized that Citizens did not take property or
exercise dominion over property belonging to Strumpf. Id. at
290. The court stated that a
section 362(a)(3) bankruptcy
filing automatically stays "any
act to obtain possession ofproperty of the estate or of property
from the estate or to exercise
control over property of the estate." Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. §
362(a)(3»). Section 362(a)(6)
automatically stays "any act to
collect, assess, or recover a
claim against the debtor that
arose before the commence-
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ment of the case under this titIe." !d. (quoting 11 U.S.C. §
363(a)(6)). The Court reiterated that Citizens' temporaryrefusal to pay was neither a taking
nor an exercise of dominion
over Strumpfs property. Id.
Instead, Citizen's refusal was
merely a refusal to perform its
promise to pay. Id. Therefore,
the Court declined to extend an
interpretation to section
362(a)(3) or 362(a)(6) that
would prohibit "the temporary
refusal of a creditor to pay a
debt that is subject to setoff
against a debt owed by the bankrupt." Id.

Inholding that the creditor bank of a bankrupt debtor
may protect its setoff rights by
temporarily withholding payment of a debt owed to the debtor, the United States Supreme
Court in Citizens BankofMd. v.
Strumpf articulated the importance of protecting such rights
in bankruptcy proceedings. In
its basic form, the Citizens Bank
decision held that an intent to
permanently settle accounts is
required when determining
whether a setoff has occurred.
Citizens Bank, however, derives
its true impact by ensuring creditor banks a means of protect-

ing their se,toff rights against
bankrupt debtors without violating the automatic stay imposed by section 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code.

- Mark L. Renbaum
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STEPPING STONE FARMHOUSE
Tucked away in the Susquehanna State Park, near Havre de Grace, Maryland, this cozy stone house
is part of a farm museum complex. In humble style and formidable construction, its contents
preserve the farm life heritage deeply rooted in Harford County.
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